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Introduction 
The 1990s delivered a decade of structural change, with astonishing rapidity, to 
electricity sectors around the world. Australia’s electricity restructuring has been hailed 
by the International Energy Agency (IEA) as a role model against which other countries 
should benchmark their own progress. A core feature of this restructuring has been to 
place far greater reliance on the market to determine pricing and investment outcomes. 
This article explores the prospects for market provision of sufficient investment to 
provide the generation and transmission capacity needed to meet forecast electricity 
demand. 
 
Today’s electricity sector 
The Australian electricity sector which existed in the early 1990s is unrecognisable 
today. Mimicking the changes initiated by the England-Wales sector and subsequently 
adopted by other international electricity sectors, the functions of generation and retail 
are exposed to competition and the natural monopoly functions of transmission and 
distribution are regulated to support competition. Electricity companies have generally 
become single function operations although, like elsewhere internationally, there is 
increasing re-integration of generation and retail activities. The vast majority of 
electricity generated and consumed in Australia is traded through the mandatory 
wholesale National Electricity Market (NEM) which commenced in late 1998.1
 Thirty-four government electricity companies existed in 1990. By December 
2007, the NEM had 126 registered participants compared to 77 when the market 
commenced some nine years earlier (NEMMCO, 1999, 2007b). However, the sector is 
dominated by government-owned companies de-integrated from former State 
government monopolies. 
   
Across the NEM, private ownership currently accounts for around 30% of 
generation and transmission capacities respectively, 52% of services to distribution 
customers and more than 60% of services to retail customers (Chester, 2007). 
Offshore transnationals dominate private ownership just like other electricity sectors 
around the world and ownership changes are an ongoing feature.2
 Retail competition has been progressively introduced, regulation has been 
increasingly transferred from State governments to Federal authorities and, like the UK 
and European Union, the regulation of electricity and gas is being merged.  
  
Two features of today’s Australian electricity sector, however, make it stand 
apart from its international counterparts. It is the only electricity sector to introduce and 
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maintain a mandatory wholesale market.3
 
 Secondly, there has been no change to the 
key policy instruments used to transform the sector such as de-integration, 
privatisation, the creation of a mandatory wholesale market, retail competition, and 
regulation of transmission and distribution.  
The current state of generation capacity 
Since 1990-91, when electricity restructuring was first mooted in Australia, total 
electricity consumption has increased by more than 50% and is forecast to grow by 
more than 60% from 2006 to 2030. A similar increase in generation capacity is needed 
to meet this expected growth (ESAA, 2003, 2007; Syed, Wilson et al, 2007).  
Different types of electricity demand are growing at different rates. Peak 
demand, defined as periods of very high or very low temperatures resulting in the use 
of air-conditioning or heating, is growing at a much faster rate than average demand, 
the level of demand which occurs most of the time.4
The NEM’s operator, the National Electricity Market Management Company 
(NEMMCO), each year releases 10-year projections of the adequacy of generation 
plants and transmission networks to meet projected demand. The most recent 
projections, assuming a scenario of extreme temperature conditions, indicate a high 
probability of electricity supply interruptions for the State of Queensland by the summer 
of 2009-10, and a similar situation the following summer in Victoria and South Australia 
followed by NSW in 2013-14 if there is no additional generation capacity to that already 
committed (NEMMCO, 2007a).
 For example, 10% of the State of 
New South Wales’ (NSW) generating capacity is being used for only 1% (or 87 hours) 
of total demand each year (NSW Government, 2004: 10). Consequently, the additional 
generation capacity needed to meet forecast demand needs to comprise both base-
load and peaking plant capacity.  
5
Installed generation capacity across Australia is nearly 45,000 MW - of which 
91% was within the NEM - and IPPs provided a further 5,170MW of capacity (ESAA, 
2007). The three eastern states of NSW, Queensland and Victoria collectively account 
for 85% of the NEM’s capacity.  
 
Installed capacity within the NEM has increased by 14% (5,113MW) since the 
mandatory wholesale market’s commencement in 1998, but 98% of this increase 
occurred during 1998-2002. Moreover, nearly two-thirds of this increase was in 
Queensland with a further 22% in South Australia. Peaking plants dominated the 
increase, with additional base-load capacity essentially being minor augmentation to 
existing plants (ESAA, 2003; IEA, 2003). Coal provides about 80% of the fuel used to 
generate Australian electricity although gas-fuelled generation has dominated additions 
to capacity in recent years.    
Table 1 shows intended and actual new NEM generation capacity for each year 
from 2000 to 2006. It is immediately apparent that only a small proportion of that 
proposed has reached construction stage. The lead times between construction and 
commissioning are also readily apparent. 
The vast majority of generation capacity currently under construction is 
expected to be commissioned by 2008-09. At least 60% of this addition will be peaking 
capacity fuelled by gas and renewables. The remainder is base-load Queensland 
capacity fuelled by coal. 
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Table 1 : Intended and actual new NEM generation capacity,  
 2000 to 2006 (MW) 6
 
 
 
Year of  
estimate 
 
Intended new generation capacity  
 
 
 
Actual increase  
in capacity Proposed Planned Under 
Construction 
 
2000 3,620 3,041 2,638 321 
2001 6,086 455 1,708 1,083 
2002 3,646 3,111 110 2,481 
2003 5,368 2,210 127 -177 
2004 11,382 3,062 1,450 105 
2005 12,187 2,239 1,575 170 
2006 13,620 4,479 1,937 28 
Source: ESAA (various years) 
 
 
Wholesale prices as an investment signal? 
The level of wholesale prices - particularly, its volatility or spikes - is claimed to signal 
the need for investment in additional generation capacity (COAG Energy Market 
Review, 2002; NEMMCO, 2005; NSW Government, 2004; Quiggin, 2003).  However, 
the IEA (2003) claims that investment in base-load generation capacity is being driven 
by long-term fundamentals rather than short-term wholesale market prices although 
these do provide sufficient incentive for peaking capacity investment.7
 Average annual NEM prices (Table 2), with the exception of NSW, have 
generally shown a downward trend in each region until 2006-07. Similar trends are 
evident in average monthly NEM prices although a different pattern of volatility is 
apparent. 
  
 
Table 2 : Average annual NEM prices, 1998-99 to 2006-07 8
Year  
 
ending 
June  
$ per MWh 
NSW Queensland South 
Australia 
Snowy 
Mountains 
Victoria 
  1999 9 33.13  51.65 156.02 32.34 36.33 
2000 28.27 44.11 59.27 27.96 26.35 
2001 37.69 41.33 56.39 37.06 44.57 
2002 34.76 35.34 31.61 31.59 30.97 
2003 32.91 37.79 30.11 29.83 27.56 
2004 32.37 28.18 34.86 30.80 25.38 
2005 39.33 28.96 36.07 34.05 27.62 
2006 37.24 28.12 37.76 31.09 32.47 
2007 58.72 52.14 51.61 55.19 54.80 
Source: NEMMCO (2008). 
 
Figure 1 shows the average monthly NEM prices for NSW, Queensland and Victoria.  
There is clearly much more volatility than that shown by the annual averages 
suggesting further volatility underlying these figures given the ‘smoothing’ which occurs 
with monthly averages.10
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Figure 1 : Average monthly prices for the NEM regions of NSW, Queensland and 
Victoria, 1999 to 2007 
 
Source: NEMMCO (2008) 
 
Price volatility within the NEM has been widely acknowledged (ABARE, 2002a; 
Australian Government, 2004; NSW Treasury, 2001; Productivity Commission, 2005b). 
The most critical aspect of this volatility is not so much its occurrence but the extent of 
the price spike and its duration. The Australian Government’s white paper, Securing 
Australia’s Energy Future, stated that NEM price spikes in 2002, while “lasting for only 
3.2% of the annual duration of the market accounted for 36% of total spot market 
costs”  (2004: 70). 
Price spikes have regularly occurred at levels well below maximum demand. 
From the commencement of the NEM in December 1998 until 31 December 2007, 
there were nearly 159,000 half-hour trading intervals. During this period, there were 
around 7,300 trading intervals (4.6%) when the wholesale price was greater than 
A$200 per MWh, but barely a quarter of these occasions have been at demand levels 
of 90% or more of maximum annual demand and on only one occasion when the 
maximum wholesale price paid in a given year was at the maximum annual demand 
level (NEMMCO, 2008). Demand has certainly not been the driver of NEM price 
volatility.  
The number of generators in the NEM has increased considerably although a 
small number of companies dominate capacity in each region. Three private owners 
currently hold ownership interests in more than 55% of Victorian capacity and two of 
these owners dominate South Australian generation capacity. Government ownership 
accounts for at least two-thirds of total NEM generation capacity.11  
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It has been claimed that the generation sub-sector is able to push the NEM’s 
prices to a level inconsistent with a competitive market by withholding capacity, either 
physical (for example, offline for maintenance) or economic, whereby a block of 
capacity is bid at a higher price band (ABARE, 2002; Booth, 2003). The cause of 
significant price spikes cannot be attributed to shortages of supply due to transmission 
congestion or capacity offline for scheduled maintenance (Booth, 2004; COAG Energy 
Market Review, 2002). The NEM’s regulatory regime does however permit re-bidding. 
The significant extent to which re-bidding moves the volume of generation capacity to a 
higher price band (at least 50%), and the high proportion of re-bids made within one 
and a half hours of dispatch (40%), signals the considerable market power held by a 
few generation companies (Chester, 2006).  
Furthermore, the majority of re-bids do not reflect the marginal cost of bringing 
extra capacity into production – assumed by the market’s design – but a higher price to 
yield a more advantageous financial outcome for the generation company concerned. 
The long-run marginal cost (LRMCs) for new generation entrants have been estimated 
at A$38.37–$53.72 per MWh for gas plants and A$31.06-$35.33 per MWh for coal 
plants (ACIL Tasman, 2005). Annual and monthly NEM prices have predominantly 
averaged around the lower end of the range for gas plants. Yet, over the period 1999 to 
2005, generators were able to sustain revenue – in each year except 2004 - above 
these estimated LRMCs even after assuming an additional average cost of A$5MWh 
for hedging (Bardak Ventures, 2005).12
Bidding practices by the NSW government-owned generator Macquarie 
Generation also contributed to the significant June 2007 price spikes (Figure 1). The 
Australian Energy Regulator (AER) found that these spikes were caused by an 
unprecedented congruence of record demand levels during a period of capacity 
shortage. Prolonged drought conditions restricted water for both cooling (Queensland) 
and generation (Tasmania and the Snowy region) while flooding and scheduled offline 
maintenance reduced NSW capacity, and transmission constraints also contributed. 
Macquarie Generation took advantage of these circumstances and repriced capacity 
into higher price bands all of which coincided with severe price spikes but did not 
breach the NEM’s regulatory regime (AER, 2007b). 
 Such a ‘revenue achievement’ occurred with 
wholesale price spikes at levels well below maximum demand. These generators were 
able to make substantial financial gains by exercising their market power, without 
breaching the bidding rules of the NEM’s regulatory regime. These same generation 
companies have also provided substantial dividend and tax equivalent payments to 
their government owners each year (Chester, 2007). 
 Overall, investment in generation capacity and its relationship to wholesale 
prices can be summarised as follows:  
• The increase in NEM generating capacity to date has been concentrated in two 
States and dominated by peaking capacity. Only marginal additions to base-load 
capacity have occurred through augmentation of existing plant; 
• Those States to benefit from a peaking capacity increase - South Australia and 
Queensland - did experience comparatively higher levels of wholesale prices in 
the early years of the NEM. This correlation, however, has not been sustained. 
The long-term upward trend in NSW prices has not stimulated private 
investment even in peaking capacity;  
• The trend in wholesale prices is not stimulating investment in base-load capacity 
notwithstanding the volatility that has occurred; 
• Demand has not driven wholesale price volatility; and 
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• NEM generation capacity is dominated by a handful of companies, the majority 
of which are government-owned. These companies have exercised their market 
power, within the NEM’s bidding rules, causing wholesale prices to spike and 
deliver significant financial gains.  
 
The storm clouds of climate change 
Divergent Federal and State government greenhouse gas abatement schemes have 
been criticised as unsustainable policy and a serious impediment to generation 
investment (ESAA, 2004; Port Jackson Partners Limited, 2005; Productivity 
Commission, 2005a).13
Climate change and greenhouse gas emissions have become major community 
concerns with an intensified political debate throughout 2007. The IEA has cited 
Australia as facing a unique challenge because emission intensity is very high at 1.5% 
of global greenhouse gas and 43% above the IEA average (IEA, 2005). Electricity 
generation produces around 38% of Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions, coal being 
primarily responsible. Coal will, however, remain electricity generation’s dominant fuel 
source for many decades given past investment in coal-fired capacity, its suitability for 
base-load generation, and its low cost relative to other fuels. 
  
The previous Federal Government announced its intention to establish an 
emissions trading system but no targets were defined. The newly elected Federal 
government took immediate steps in December 2007 to ratify the Kyoto protocol and 
has a number of climate change policy commitments including the development of 
renewable energy, clean coal technology and a national emissions trading scheme. 
However, the Prime Minister has categorically ruled out the setting of targets to cut 
greenhouse gas emissions prior to the late 2008 completion of the Garnaut Climate 
Change Review.14
Consequently, critical considerations for new investment in electricity 
generation are the potential for adverse environmental impacts and the additional costs 
that may be incurred to meet government emission trading or other forms of abatement 
schemes.
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 Policy uncertainty, as well as the time needed to develop new 
commercially viable technologies, makes generation investment planning tenuous at 
best and adds some support to the IEA claims of base-load capacity investment being 
driven by long-term fundamentals rather than wholesale price movements.  
The current state of transmission interconnections 
Regulated interconnectors - ones which have passed the regulatory test, are deemed 
to add value to the NEM and receive annual revenue determined by regulation 
regardless of usage - operate between all adjacent regions of the NEM. One 
interconnector, Basslink, is unregulated and generates revenue from spot price 
differentials between NEM regions.16
The transmission interconnections between NEM regions are shown in Table 2. 
Only two major interconnections have been built since 1991 - the Queensland-NSW 
Interconnector (QNI) in 2001 and Basslink, between Tasmania and Victoria, in 2006. 
Directlink and Murraylink only provided minor additions to capacity. The QNI and the 
two long-standing Snowy interconnectors provide the greatest transfer capacity within 
the NEM.  
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A key NEM objective is to export electricity to a region when demand cannot be 
met by local generators or when the price of electricity in an adjoining region is lower 
than local supply. For such trade to occur, high-voltage transmission lines with 
adequate import–export capacity need to be in place. For NSW and Victoria, import 
capacity is a little more than a third of their respective generation capacity whereas 
South Australia and Tasmania have an import capacity of around 19%, and 
Queensland has 4%.  
 
Table 2 : Transmission interconnector capacity 
 
Interconnector 
 
Region 
Maximum  
transfer  
capacity  
(MW) 
QNI Queensland to New South Wales 
New South Wales to Queensland 
1080 
300 
Directlink Queensland to New South Wales 
New South Wales to Queensland 
180 
80 
SNO-NSW Snowy Mountains to New South Wales 3000 
SNO-VIC Snowy Mountains to Victoria 1900 
VIC-SA Victoria to South Australia 
South Australia to Victoria 
460 
330 
Murraylink Victoria to South Australia 
South Australia to Victoria 
220 
150 
Basslink Tasmania to Victoria 
Victoria to Tasmania 
600 
480 
Source: AER (2007b) 
 
NEMMCO’s scheduling of generators is thus heavily dependent on the physical 
transfer capacity of available interconnectors. When the technical limit of capacity is 
reached, local generators must be dispatched to meet outstanding local demand. This 
means that higher spot prices occur than would be the case without capacity 
constraints.17
NEMMCO has reported for some years that augmentation is required between 
Victoria to the Snowy Mountains, Snowy Mountains to Victoria, and Queensland and 
NSW (both directions) (NEMMCO, 2007a).  
 Transmission constraints contributed to the severe spike in June 2007 
NEM prices. 
As a result of existing interconnector capacities, the NEM operates essentially 
as six regional markets, with generators and retailers largely trading intra-regionally. 
Reasons posited for little augmentation include: the absence of national network 
planning; a lengthy and uncertain approval process for new investments (for example, 
a proposal to connect SA and Victoria first arose in 1998, took three years for approval 
but is still to commence due to litigation); flaws in the current regulatory benefits test 
used to assess augmentation proposals; complex NEM rules and procedures; and 
agreements to allow unregulated transmission interconnectors which have a strong 
interest in maintaining NEM regional price differentials (Booth, 2003; COAG Energy 
Market Review, 2002; Port Jackson Partners Limited, 2005).  
The AER has been given responsibility for national transmission planning as 
well as regulation of transmission pricing and augmentation proposals. The regulatory 
benefits test has been reviewed and adjusted. There is no evidence, however, of any 
support for an approach which combines market incentives for small transmission 
augmentation and incentive regulation for large augmentation projects, an approach 
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regarded by others as possibly the most realistic way to effectively stimulate the 
expansion of electricity transmission (Hogan, 2003; Rosellón, 2003). In the meantime, 
proposals for new investment are not materialising. 
 
What are the prospects for investment in sufficient capacity to meet 
projected electricity demand? 
The Australian Energy Regulator recently claimed that the “NEM has generated 
sufficient investment capacity to keep pace with rising demand ... and to provide a 
‘safety margin’ of capacity to maintain the reliability of the power system” (AER, 2007a: 
73). The foregoing discussion has signalled a number of reasons which may well 
prevent this situation from continuing. 
Australian electricity demand is growing rapidly, especially peak demand when 
extreme temperatures occur. Generation capacity has increased although 
predominantly in Queensland peaking plants. Timely investment in new base-load 
generation capacity to meet forecast demand and reliability standards is not being 
stimulated by long-term NEM prices but the sector now relies on price signals to 
determine new investment. The movement in wholesale prices is not signalling, as 
widely believed, generation capacity constraints although these are being projected by 
the market operator. The volatility in wholesale electricity prices is being driven not by 
demand but a handful of generators exercising market power, and transmission 
constraints.  
Coal is currently the most cost-effective fuel for base-load capacity but one of 
the highest contributors to greenhouse gas. The dearth of investment in new base-load 
capacity is being compounded by the prospect of significant capital costs to meet 
prospective policies requiring reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. 
The Australian Energy Regulator (2007a) posited that mixed ownership within 
the sector has led to an ‘uneasiness’ about investment which privatisation of electricity 
assets still in public ownership may overcome. A more recent report to the NSW 
Government contended that public ownership inhibited private sector generation 
investment which will occur “when wholesale prices and market-related conditions point 
to a decision based upon commercial criteria” (Owen, 2007: vii). If this is the case, no 
new private sector investment will occur until all generation assets are privatised. Little 
other than marginal augmentation to base-load capacity has occurred since the 
privatisation of Victorian and South Australian generation assets. The impending sale 
of NSW generation will mean that 60% of NEM capacity will be privately owned. Is this 
a sufficient level of private ownership to allay the alleged uneasiness before private 
investment commences? Or will the remaining 40% - held in government ownership 
across Queensland, the Snowy Mountains region and Tasmania – need to be also 
privatised for there to be a sufficient investment stimulus? The NSW sale will take at 
least 18 months to achieve assuming current community opposition dissipates 
sufficiently. Further potential privatisations would extend the timeframe considerably. In 
the meantime, demand grows and capacity tightens. 
But what of the level of wholesale prices, potential climate change policies and 
transmission capacity? Will new private owners of progressively privatised generation 
assets exercise market power as owners before them have done and manipulate 
wholesale price outcomes to earn sufficient returns to repay debt used to purchase 
generation assets, meet LRMCs and provide healthy financial payouts to their 
shareholders? Without changes to the NEM bidding rules, it is difficult to see why such 
opportunities would be overlooked notwithstanding that new entrants will remain 
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dissuaded. As for climate change policies, it will take some years for these to be 
formulated and fully implemented. In the meantime, demand grows and capacity 
tightens. 
Privatisation of NSW, or any other, generation assets will not be sufficient in 
itself to stimulate timely capacity investment in order to meet forecast demand. Clearer 
definition of climate change policies and their application will provide greater certainty 
about potential costs. But until these costs are known and the extent to which 
government may assist implementation, private investors will not commit to new 
capacity. Moreover that commitment will be muted without sufficient augmentation to 
transmission capacity to ameliorate the current constraints on import-export. 
On the basis of current policy settings, the time horizon for investment in 
sufficient generation and transmission capacity to meet forecast demand over the next 
10 years is bleak and the security of Australia’s electricity supply is under threat.  
 
 
 
Footnotes 
                                                
1 The land area of Australia is roughly comparable to the US although more than 85% of the 
population is concentrated along the eastern seaboard and in the south-east. The NEM covers 
the southern and eastern States and Territories (Queensland, NSW, ACT, Victoria, Tasmania 
and South Australia). The geographic remoteness of the population centres of Western 
Australia and the Northern Territory make the cost of transmission interconnection to a national 
grid prohibitive. 
2 Privatisation of former government electricity companies has occurred but not to the extent 
often claimed. The NSW Government’s November 2007 announcement of its intention to sell its 
generation and retail assets will result in around 60% of NEM generation capacity being 
privately owned. 
3 Spain’s centralised market is only part mandatory. 
4 In NSW, summer peak demand increased by 3.8% per annum from 1999 to 2004 while 
average demand grew annually by 2.8%. The forecast growth in peak power demand in Victoria 
is 3% per annum until 2020 compared to total growth in demand of 2% each year. 
5 These projections are based on the generating and transmission capacity to maintain the 
agreed standard of supply reliability within each NEM region. The system is deemed reliable if, 
over the long-term, at least 99.998% of consumer energy demand can be met. 
6 Proposed refers to proposals that have not been fully evaluated or received all necessary 
approvals to become a more definite prospect of proceeding. Planned is equivalent to a definite 
commitment although still subject to final decisions before construction is commenced. Not all of 
the proposals in this latter group will be found to be sufficiently viable to proceed to full planning. 
7 The more capital-intensive base-load generation (for example, coal) is costly and hence, it is 
claimed that investment will be stimulated by a long-term trend in higher prices. Less capital-
intensive plants (for example, gas) are easier to start up, although more expensive to operate, 
and thus highly suitable to supply short peak periods of demand. Investment in these peaking 
plants will also require a sustained trend in higher prices but, being of a lower capital cost, the 
payback period is considerably shorter. 
8 Tasmania is not included because data is only available from mid 2005. 
9 Seven months only from December 1998 to June 1999.  
10 Average monthly figures for each NEM region are derived from over 1,400 prices given the 48 
half-hour trading intervals per day and, for the majority of the year, at least 30 trading days per 
month. A more complex picture of volatility is shown by average daily and half-hourly spot 
prices (see Chester, 2006). 
11 In 1995 there were nine government-owned generation companies, two privately owned and 
four integrated government companies. By the end of 2006, this group of companies had grown 
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to 24 (nine government, thirteen private and one integrated). In addition, a number of private 
generators had commenced operating.  
12 During 2002-05, only NSW and Queensland (government-owned) generators exceeded the 
new entry LRMCs. Victorian generators were broadly equivalent and those in South Australia 
below. 
13 For example, the Federal government’s Mandatory Renewable Energy Target scheme has 
been criticised for being biased towards wind power which is far more costly than conventional 
energy but is only available when there is wind. Hence, conventional energy is required as a 
back-up which adds considerably to capital costs. The NSW Greenhouse Abatement Scheme 
has been found to lead to minimal cuts in emissions but with considerable costs to electricity 
consumers. 
14 This review was commissioned in April by the Federal Labor Party, when in opposition, and 
all State and Territory Governments. A final report is due in September 2008. 
15 In 2005, the Victorian government reached agreement with International Power, majority 
owner of Hazelwood Power (1600MW), for a reduction in emissions of 34 million tonnes during 
the next 25 years in return for access to 43 million tonnes of brown coal. Currently the generator 
emits 17 million tonnes per annum of greenhouse gases and will need to spend A$400 million to 
meet the agreed target. 
16 Two interconnectors, Murraylink and Directlink, were built as unregulated interconnectors but 
subsequently met the regulatory test in 2003 and 2006 respectively.  
17 It is claimed that NEM regional price differentials, due to transmission capacity constraints, 
have added from A$1.6 to 2.6 billion to the cost of wholesale electricity each year since 1999  
(Port Jackson Partners Limited, 2005). The cost of transmission network congestion has been 
estimated at: A$36 million in 2003-04, A$45 million in 2004-05, A$66 million in 2005-06 and 
A$107 million in 2006-07 (AER, 2007c). 
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